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Abstract
I study the long run determinacy tradeo¤ recurrent episodes of passive monetary
policy are (in)determinate if their expected duration is long (brief ) when passive pol-
icy is at the zero bound. On-going regime change implies qualitatively di¤erent shock
transmission from the standard New Keynesian model. For U.S. baseline parameter
values, I nd temporary scal stimulus is e¤ective, while adverse supply shocks can be
expansionary if the central banks active policy stance is weak and/or if the liquidity
traps average duration exceeds 3 quarters.
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1 Introduction
How do expectations of recurring zero interest rates a¤ect the transmission of fundamental
shocks? In an important contribution, Davig and Leeper (2007) generalized the Taylor
(1993) principle the proposition that central banks stabilize the economy by raising their
policy rate more than one-for-one in response to higher ination from a xed-regime to a
regime-switching New Keynesian model. Monetary policys reaction to uctuations can then
switch from an active regime, characterized by an aggressive ination response, to a passive
regime with less aggressive response following a Markov chain with exogenous transition
probabilities.
A key insight of these authors is that determinate (i.e., unique and bounded) solution
paths depend on all model parameters. Of these, in this paper I focus on the passive
regimes expected duration when conventional monetary policy is completely passive and
short-term nominal interest rates are at their zero bound (ZB). This matters for three reasons.
First, the impact elasticities of output to fundamental shocks tend to be very di¤erent
when conventional policy is switched o¤. For example, the New Keynesian model predicts
that temporary adverse supply shocks are expansionary at the ZB, while the multiplier
e¤ect of government spending shocks is sharply higher.1 Second, equilibrium indeterminacy
leads to non-unique propagation of fundamental shocks and excess volatility caused by non-
fundamentals (sunspots), and should thus be avoided; see Benhabib et al. (2002) and Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004). And, third, the profession is gradually realizing that ZB episodes are
not one-o¤ but may recur. The U.S. 3-month Treasury Bill data shown in Figure 1 indicates
the ZB constraint has been binding about 6:6 percent over the period 1934:01-2015:05:2
FIGURE 1 HERE
To be sure, one may question inference based on 80 years of data considering the profound
structural changes in the economy, as well as the conduct of monetary policy in the last
1On the New Keynesian predictions of expansionary adverse supply shocks and amplied government
spending multiplier at the ZB see Christiano et al. (2011), Wieland (2014) and Woodford (2011).
2A ZB episode is a period when 3-month T-Bill rates do not exceed 25 basis points. The resulting
empirical frequency is 0:066, or 64=972 months, of which 28 were in the 1930s and 36 have occurred since
December 2008. Note that Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Christiano et al. (2011) and Mertens and Ravn
(2014) all assume truncated Markov chains, so liquidity traps are non-recurring (one-o¤ ) by construction.
Models with a recurring passive regime include Nakata (2014), Nakata and Schmidt (2014), Richter and
Throckmorton (2015) and Tambakis (2014).
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century. That said, Chung et al. (2012) conclude that, in the face of growing uncertainty
about large negative demand shocks, 25 years is too small a sample for evaluating tail risks.3
I follow Davig and Leeper (2007) in specifying that regime change is an exogenous (iid)
Markov process, based on what these authors call the emergency response-driven trigger
of the ZB regime. In principle, the likelihood that future regimes di¤er from the present
one may also be triggered by sunspot or condence shocks (Mertens and Ravn (2014)).
Following the long-run determinacy principle, large deviations from the original Taylor (1993)
principle as when conventional monetary policy is switched o¤must be short-lived.
It follows that requiring equilbrium paths to be determinate implies a maximum average
duration for ZB episodes. Specically, for U.S. baseline parameters values I establish that
ZB episodes expected to last more than 3 quarters are inconsistent with determinacy, all else
equal. E¤ectively, imposing a minimum exit rate from liquidity traps amounts to restricting
attention to fundamental-based ZB episodes.
Assuming fundamental-shock uctuations around a unique steady state, the New Key-
nesian DSGE consensus is that temporary adverse supply shocks are recessionary in normal
times but expansionary at the ZB, while the government spending multiplier is amplied.
Against that background, I show the puzzlingimplications only arise when equilibrium is
indeterminate. Specically, short-term scal stimulus is always expansionary and temporary
adverse supply shocks are generally contractionary. During liquidity traps, however, the
output impact of such shocks can be positive if the central bank active policy stance is weak.
Intuitively, agents expect higher ination because they anticipate a less reactive monetary
policy in the active regime. In turn, that expectation lowers expected real interest rates and
stimulates current output. Adopting a progressively less responsive active policy stance, the
output elasticity of a 1 standard deviation ination shock can be as high as 4:5. By contrast,
the government spending multiplier at the ZB is around 4 regardless of the specic policy
rule, provided the ZB episode is expected to be brief. Thus, temporary scal consolidation
is never expansionary inside the determinacy region. Comparing across regimes, I nd the
spending multiplier is about 0:6 in the active regime but always exceeds one during liquidity
traps, starting around 1:7 for one-o¤ ZB events.
The results suggest the possibility that the on-going, long ZB episode is indeterminate.
A similar uncomfortable implication was raised by Davig and Leeper (2007) commenting
on Lubik and Schorfheides (2004) conclusion about U.S. monetary policy prior to 1982.
The reason is that, as in the regime-switching framework liquidity traps determinate or
3Partly also in response to such uncertainty, inuential commentators such as Krugman (2013) have
argued that near-zero interest rates may constitute the new normal for monetary policy.
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indeterminate are recurrent, they cannot be avoided by policy measures including forward
guidance (Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)), aggressive scal expansion (Benhabib et al.
(2002)), or coordinating equilibrium selection (Mertens and Ravn (2014)), to name but
a few. All these contributions assume ZB events are temporary. Rather, the empirical
implication here is that, given their exogenous incidence, policymakers should strive to limit
their duration, so as to prevent the welfare deterioration commonly associated with non-
unique fundamental transmission and sunspot-driven business cycles.
2 The regime-switching model
A closed economy with nominal rigidities is described by the forward-looking aggregate
supply (AS/NKPC) and demand (AD) relationships
t = xt + Ett+1 + u
S
t (1)
xt = Etxt+1    1(it   Ett+1) + uDt (2)
where the period-t ination rate t, output gap xt and nominal interest rate it hence-
forth, the policy rate  are expressed in log deviations from a unique steady-state, and
the parameters have the familiar interpretation.4 The mean-zero AS and AD shocks, uSt
and uDt respectively, are exogenous demand (government spending) and supply (ination, or
productivity) disturbances following independent stationary AR(1) processes:
uDt = D u
D
t 1 + "
D
t ; u
S
t = S u
S
t 1 + "
S
t (3)
where D, S 2 [0; 1) and "Dt , "St are iid random variables with standard deviations D, S.
In any period, the economy is either in the active regime, denoted a, where the policy
rate is strictly positive and determined by a Taylor-type rule, or the passive (ZB) regime, z,
where it is zero and the feedback portion of the rule is inactive:5
iat = at + xxat ; Prfst = a j 
tg = Pa (4)
izt = 0 ; Prfst = z j 
tg = Pz
where  > 1, x  0, st 2 fa; zg, 
t = fst 1; st 2; :::g and the regimesergodic probabilities
Pa and Pz are dened below.
4 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor; NKPC slope  > 0 is proportional to the degree of nominal rigidity;
and  1 > 0 is the interest-elasticity of output.
5I do not label the regimes conventional and unconventional because my model is highly stylized, ab-
stracting from non-traditional policy instruments including large-scale asset purchases by the central bank.
I also refrain from calling the active regime normal because of Japans ZB experience since the 1990s.
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Regime change in equations (4) is not triggered by large fundamental or taste shocks as
in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), where the policy rule is it = maxfrnt + t; 0g with a
time-varying natural real interest rate. Rather, it captures monetary policys periodic shift
in focus from price stability to concerns such as systemic risk and nancial stability. The
short-run dynamics are driven by the homogeneous Markov transition matrix:
M =
"
paa paz
pza pzz
#
The o¤-diagonal elements, pij > 0 (i; j 2 fa; zg) satisfying pii + pij = 1, are dened as
Prfst = z j st 1 = ag = paz , Prfst = a j st 1 = zg = pza (5)
where st is independent of uDt and u
S
t . Regime i persistence and expected duration are then
given by pii > 0 and (1   pii) 1 = Ti > 1, respectively.6 Each recurrent policy regime has
positive ergodic probability given by:
Pz =
paz
paz + pza
, Tz =
Pz
paz(1  Pz) (6)
Pa =
pza
paz + pza
, Ta =
Pa
pza(1  Pa) (7)
where Pa + Pz = 1; see Hamilton (1994). Equations (6)-(7) imply a long-run tradeo¤: if
regime is incidence increases then its expected duration must become shorter, and vice versa.
As shown by Davig and Leeper (2007) and Richter and Throckmorton (2015), equilibrium
determinacy requires the ZB regimes expected duration to be su¢ ciently short. Put dif-
ferently, the long-run Taylor principle need not hold every period provided large deviations
from it are short-lived; see also Nakata and Schmidt (2014).
Shock propagation under a xed active regime is well understood: positive AD shocks
are expansionary and inationary; adverse AS shocks are stagationary. Otherwise, the New
Keynesian Markov-switching model is fully described by the linear system
Byt = AEtyt+1 + Cut ,
 yt = Etyt+1 + vt (8)
where    A 1B provided A is invertible; vt  A 1Cut; yt is the 4x1 regime-dependent
target variable vector; ut is the 2x1 fundamental shock vector:
6Nakata (2014) and Nakata and Schmidt (2014) also refer to paz and pzz as the ZB regimes frequency
and persistence.
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yt =
0BBB@
at
zt
xat
xzt
1CCCA, Etyt+1 =
0BBB@
Etat+1
Etzt+1
Etxat+1
Etxzt+1
1CCCA, ut =
 
uSt
uDt
!
and
A =
26664
paa paz 0 0
pza pzz 0 0
 1paa  1paz paa paz
 1pza  1pzz pza pzz
37775 , B =
26664
1 0   0
0 1 0  
 1 0 1 + 
 1x 0
0 0 0 1
37775 , C =
26664
1 0
1 0
0 1
0 1
37775 (9)
Matrix A includes the exogenous transition probabilities; matrix B includes the active re-
sponse coe¢ cients  and x; and C stacks the fundamental shocks. Davig and Leeper
(2007) show that the solutions of (8) are determinate i¤ all four eigenvalues of  , denoted i
(i = 1; :::; 4) are outside the unit circle. That is indeed the case for most parameter values
when the passive regime is the ZB.7 In general, the solution paths of (8) are given by:
yt = Gut + V wt (10)
wt = wt 1 +Mut (11)
where wt is a non-fundamental variable. Let k is the number of eigenvalues of   inside the
unit circle. Then V is 2xk,  is kxk, and M is any kx2 real matrix. If k = 1, matrix 
becomes a scalar equal to the eigenvalue inside the unit circle, measuring sunspot persistence.
It is important for policymakers to avoid actions that would induce indeterminacy, as the
excess output volatility caused by sunspots reduces welfare if agents are risk-averse. In what
follows I focus on linear minimum state variable (MSV) solutions within the determinate
region (k = 0). The MSV solutions of system (8) involve four target variables:
at = b
D
a u
D
t + b
S
a u
S
t , xat = c
D
a u
D
t + c
S
a u
S
t (12)
zt = b
D
z u
D
t + b
S
z u
S
t , xzt = c
D
z u
D
t + c
S
z u
S
t (13)
Coe¢ cient vectors [bSa ; b
S
z ; c
S
a ; c
S
z ]
0 and [bDa ; b
D
z ; c
D
a ; c
D
z ]
0 are regime-specic impact elasticities.
Assuming a determinate solution to the regime-switching model (8) exists and guessing the
7The determinacy region is very similar to Davig and Leeper (2007). It, and the proof that the Markov-
switching model with a passive ZB regime has indeterminacy of degree one are available upon request.
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ination and output paths in (12)-(13), the equilibrium elasticities solve:26664
1  paaS  pazS   0
 pzaS 1  pzzS 0  
 1(   paaS)   1pazS 1 +  1x   paaS  pazS
  1pzaS   1pzzS  pzaS 1  pzzS
37775
26664
bSa
bSz
cSa
cSz
37775 =
26664
1
1
0
0
37775 (14)
for AS shocks and26664
1  paaD  pazD   0
 pzaD 1  pzzD 0  
 1(   paaD)   1pazD 1 +  1x   paaD  pazD
  1pzaD   1pzzD  pzaD 1  pzzD
37775
26664
bDa
bDz
cDa
cDz
37775 =
26664
0
0
1
1
37775 (15)
for AD shocks. Analytical solutions to equation systems (14)-(15) are readily computed but
di¢ cult to interpret; note that one-o¤ ZB events amount to the special case pza = 1.
3 Expectation formation e¤ects
Leading equations (12)-(13) by one period, applying denitions (3) and imposing S = D =
, wlog, the regime-specic ination and output gap expectations are:
Esttt+1 = Et[t+1 j st = i] = pii(DbDi uDt + SbSi uSt ) (16)
+pij(Db
D
j u
D
t + Sb
S
j u
S
t )
Esttxt+1 = Et[xt+1 j st = i] = pii(DcDi uDt + ScSi uSt ) (17)
+pij(Dc
D
j u
D
t + Sc
S
j u
S
t )
where i; j 2 fa; zg. All else equal, equations (16)-(17) indicate that expectation formation
e¤ects from regime i to j increase in pji > 0 and pii > 0. The two transition probabilities
are independently determined by Markov matrixM .8 To gauge expectation spillovers across
regimes, I apply expectation denitions (16)-(17) to AD relation (2) and write:
xzt = f1 + pzz[cDz   cDa +  1(bDz   bDa )]guDt (18)
+pzz[c
S
z   cSa +  1(bSz   bSa )]uSt + (cDa +  1bDa )uDt + (cSa +  1bSa )uSt
xat = f1 + paa[cDz   cDa +  1(bDz   bDa )]guDt (19)
+paa[c
S
z   cSa +  1(bSz   bSa )]uSt + (cDa +  1bDa )uDt + (cSa +  1bSa )uSt
  1[(bDa + xcDa )uDt + (bSa + xcSa )uSt ]
8If the ZB constraint was approached gradually then setting a higher ination target would lower ZB
incidence, all else equal, and paz could not be specied exogenously; see Chung et al. (2012).
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The four regime-specic output elasticities are dened as cfi =
@xit
@uft
, f 2 fD;Sg, i 2 fa; zg. A
useful benchmark of on-going regime change on cfi is equal expected duration, paa = pzz = p.
Equations (18)-(19) then imply:
cDz =
1 + [(1  p)cDa +  1bDa + p 1(bDz   bDa )]
1  p (20)
cDa =
1 + [cDz + 
 1bDa + p
 1(bDz   bDa )]   1(bDa + xcDa )
1  p+  1x
(21)
for AD and
cSz =
[(1  p)cSa + p 1(bSz   bSa ) +  1bSa ]
1  p (22)
cSa =
p[cSz + 
 1(bSz   bSa )]   1bSa (   )
1  (1  p) +  1x
(23)
for AS shocks. Equations (20)-(23) indicate fundamental disturbances are propagated as
follows:
AD shocks. Temporary scal expansions are more potent at the ZB by the standard
(xed) active transmission channel: cDz > c
D
a .
9 From that consensus ranking, consider the
e¤ect on cDz of a persistence increase, p > 0 wlog. Noting the elasticity functional forms are
hyperbolic in p, the denominator of cDz in equation (20) increases unambigously. Provided
positive AD shocks are more inationary at the ZB (bDz > b
D
a ), the c
D
z numerator rises by
 1(bDz   bDa ) as agents anticipate the ZB to last longer. It also declines by cDa , however,
because a return to active policy is less likely. The sign of cDz depends on the level of p.
Now consider shortening average ZB duration, pzz < paa wlog. This has two complemen-
tary e¤ects. It directly lowers cDz and, by symmetry, relatively higher paa raises c
D
a . Note that
lower cDz enters as +c
D
z in c
D
a , while higher c
D
a enters as  pzzcDa in cDz . It follows that the
indirect e¤ect of lower pzz is higher cDa . Conversely, a more persistent active regime lowers
cDz so the two e¤ects are reinforcing. It is also easy to check that white noise fundamentals
( = 0) imply cDa =
1  1(bDa +xcDa )
1+ 1x
< 1 and cDz = 1.
AS shocks. The impact of lower pzz on cSz in equation (23) is ambiguous a priori. First,
note that  = 0 implies cSz = 0: the output gap is insulated from supply shocks at the ZB
unless they are persistent. Then, given bSz > b
S
a , the negative shock to pzz lowers c
S
z by
 1(bDz   bDa ). It also means a return to active policy is more likely, pza > 0. In turn,
given cSa < 0, that implies c
S
z declines more than before, by c
S
a . At the same time the
9To see this, note that the numerator (denominator) of (20) is less (greater) than of (21) for all  1 > 0.
The regime-specic ination rates are similarly obtained by substituting (16)-(17) to AS relation (1).
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denominator of cSz rises for all  > 0. The net output impact of adverse supply (inationary)
shocks is thus more negative. Conversely, however, such shocks are less contractionary, or
even expansionary for longer-lasting liquidity traps.
Further, the sign of cSz in (23) is independent of the magnitude of c
D
z . Hence, the model
can generate contractionary ination shocks at the ZB without violating the consensus view
on large (above one) government spending multipliers.10
One-o¤ ZB events. If the active regime is absorbing (pza = 1), the regime-specic
spending multipliers and ZB-specic output elasticity to AS shocks become:
cDa =
1 + [cDz + 
 1bDa + (1  paz) 1(bDz   bDa )]   1(bDa + xcDa )
1  (1  paz) +  1x
(24)
cDz =
1 + (cDa + 
 1bDa )
1   , c
S
z = (c
S
a + 
 1bSa ) (25)
More severe ZB episodes (higher paz) lower cDa , indicating that ignoring recurrent regime
change is likely to underestimate the average government spending multiplier.
4 Fundamental shock transmission
4.1 Baseline calibration
In calibrating the regime-switching model, I adopt as baseline the U.S. parameter estimates
of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Davig and Leeper (2007), referred to as LS and DL,
with the exception of the choice of pzz and the active policy stance where I use the optimal
policy response coe¢ cients of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), referred to as SU. They are
summarized in Table 1:
Table 1. Baseline parameterization
Quarterly discount factor  = 0:99
Price rigidity (NKPC slope)  = 0:17
Interest-elasticity of output  1 = 1
Shock persistence S = D = 0:75
Shock variability S = 0:80 , D = 0:23
Active regime responses  = 3; x = 0 (SU )
Regime persistence paa = 0:975 , pzz = 0:647
10It is worth contrasting this property with Wieland (2014), where the spending multiplier at the ZB
exceeds one (cDz > 1) if and only if adverse AS shocks are expansionary (c
S
z > 0).
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I combine paa = 0:975 one ZB episode per decade, on average with pzz = 0:647 (Tz =
2:83 quarters), the passive regime persistence matching Pz = 0:066, the U.S. historical ZB
frequency from Figure 1.11 That is because the LS choice of pzz = 0:93 liquidity traps
expected to last 3:5 years  is inconsistent with determinacy. To see why, I establish a
maximum persistence threshold, pmaxzz < 1 i.e., a minimum ZB exit rate p
min
za > 0 beyond
which equilibrium solution paths become indeterminate. I illustrate this threshold in Figure
2, xing paa = 0:975 and plotting min, the minimum eigenvalue of system (8) against pzz:
FIGURE 2 HERE
In all four cases, min crosses the indeterminacy point ( = 1) only once because the regime-
switching New Keynesian model displays degree-one indeterminacy. Under the baseline
(Panel A), the maximum persistence is pmaxzz = 0:668, implying p
min
za = 0:332 or T

z ' 3
quarters. The tentative implication is that historical ZB persistence is narrowly consistent
with equilibrium determinacy, as dened in the recurrent regime-switching model.12 In Panel
B, a weaker active transmission mechanism extends the threshold to pmaxzz = 0:753, that is
Tmaxz ' 4 quarters. In Panel C, more price exibility limits the threshold to pmaxzz = 0:501.
Liquidity traps expected to last beyond six months then yield indeterminate equilibria. In
Panel D the less reactive policy rules of LS-DL and Taylor (1993) reduce the threshold only
marginally, to pmaxzz = 0:656 and 0:620, respectively.
To put these numbers in perspective, by 2015q2 the current ZB episode has lasted 22
quarters, amounting to pzz = 0:945. When passive means less active, DL nd that the
minimum exit rate for determinacy is pminza = 0:10 (p
max
zz = 0:90). The fact that my minimum
exit rates are higher also conforms with LSs key point that loose Fed monetary policy in the
1970s is consistent with multiple equilibria. Hence, insisting on ZB persistence below pmaxzz
focuses attention on determinate liquidity traps.
Table 2 below reports the unique and bounded regime-specic solutions implied by three
di¤erent active policy stances:
11Substituting this ergodic probability and the exogenous ZB incidence of LS-DL, paz = 0:025, into
equation (6) yields pzz = 0:647.
12Validating this conclusion would require further long-run identifying restrictions, especially concerning
the lag lengths specied for endogenous variables; see the debate between Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and
Beyer and Farmer (2007) and the discussion in Tambakis (2014).
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Table 2. Regime-specic impact elasticities13
Active Zero Bound
paa = 0:975 ; pzz = 0:647 Pa = 0:934 Pz = 0:066
Ination
SU baseline: pmaxzz = 0:674 at = 0:42u
D
t + 0:62u
S
t zt = 1:46u
D
t + 2:14u
S
t
LS-DL: pmaxzz = 0:656 at = 0:50u
D
t + 1:53u
S
t zt = 1:57u
D
t + 3:36u
S
t
T : pmaxzz = 0:620 at = 0:62u
D
t + 2:52u
S
t zt = 1:73u
D
t + 4:68u
S
t
Output gap
SU baseline xat = 0:53uDt   5:11uSt xzt = 3:80uDt   0:29uSt
LS-DL xat = 0:65uDt   3:76uSt xzt = 4:01uDt + 2:02uSt
T xat = 0:82uDt   2:30uSt xzt = 4:32uDt + 4:52uSt
Comparing the SU baseline to LS-DL and T suggests several transmission properties: (i)
Both shocks are more inationary at the ZB, and the less aggressive the central banks active
policy stance. (ii) The output impact of temporary positive AD shocks is much higher at
the ZB. By comparison, Christiano et al. (2011) report the interval [0:8; 1:2]. (iii) Adverse
AS shocks are contractionary in normal times, relatively less if output is shielded by more
accommodating active policy.14 (iv) Adverse AS shocks are mildly contractionary at the ZB
only under SU. However, if the active regimes anti-ination stance weakens (LS-DL, T )
they become expansionary.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
In Figure 3 I present the evolution of the four output elasticities with passive persistence:
FIGURE 3 HERE
The results suggest expectation formation e¤ects gain (lose) signicance with ZB expected
duration in the passive (active) regime. In Panel A, the active government spending multi-
plier ranges from cDa = 0:57, when ZB events are one-o¤, to 0:53 approaching p
max
zz . Fiscal
stimulus is much more e¤ective at the ZB (Panel B): the multiplier grows from cDz = 1:73 to
13Row 2 reports the ergodic probabilities of each policy regime. The parameter values are as in Table 1
with the exception of LS -DL and T. These denote  = 2:19; x = 0:3, the response coe¢ cients of Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) and Davig and Leeper (2007), and  = 1:5; x = 0:5 from Taylor (1993), respectively.
14This policy tradeo¤ is familiar from the xed regime model. The sensitivities of the ination elasticities
to pzz and  are not reported to save space.
11
3:96 around pmaxzz . It becomes even more e¤ective if active monetary policy is less reactive:
cDz ranges from [0:65; 4:17], under LS-DL, to [0:82; 4:49] under T.
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In Fig. 3, Panel C temporary ination shocks are contractionary in the active regime,
in line with the consensus view. The impact elasticities are very stable around  5. Against
that, in liquidity traps output is very sensitive to their expected duration (Panel D). Starting
at  3:33 as pzz ! 0, cSz declines in absolute to  0:06 as pmaxzz = 0:67 and then turns positive.
The ensuing positive range, however, is incompatible with determinacy. Consistent with
equations (20)-(23), longer liquidity traps boost (dampen) the impact of AD (AS) shocks
within the determinacy region.
One can interpret the above fundamental asymmetry as follows. If the ZB regime becomes
more likely, expected ination in equation (16) rises. As argued by Wieland (2014), this
lowers expected real interest rates, which stimulates consumption and output. As at the
ZB the negative AS shock would be recessionary, the greater expected duration amplies
the ination expectation e¤ect, mitigating the slowdown. And if the active stance weakens,
expected real interest rates decline further so the net impact may be expansionary.
Turning to fundamental persistence, Figure 4 presents the behavior of the output elas-
ticities maintaining regime persistence at baseline and varying  on the unit interval:
FIGURE 4 HERE
In Panel A, the active spending multiplier declines with AD shock persistence, turning
negative (expansionary austerity) around  ' 0:95, while the ZB-specic multiplier grows
smoothly with  (Panel B). Similarly, in the active regime the contractionary impact of
negative AS shocks strengthens with  (Panel C ). These elasticities are not very sensitive
to the interest-rate rule the central bank implements in normal times. By contrast, in
Panel D the sign of cSz from  = 0 is determined by the active policy stance. Temporary
ination shocks are recessionary for the aggressive baseline SU policy response (bold line),
but expansionary under the less reactive LS-DL and T response coe¢ cients (dotted line).
Expectation formation e¤ects from a to z are stronger if the active stance weakens.
15Christiano al. (2011) also nd a positive monotonic link between cDz and Tz. By contrast, Mertens and
Ravn (2014) show scal multipliers are much larger for brief, fundamental-based liquidity traps. See also
Nakata (2014).
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5 Concluding remarks
In contrast to Tambakis (2014), in the present paper I studied short-term fundamental shock
transmission in a New Keynesian recurrent regime-switching model when passive policy in-
volves the ZB. I showed that relatively short (long) ZB episodes are (in)determinate, and
explored the impact elasticitiessensitivity to ZB expected duration and fundamental shock
persistence. For determinate liquidity traps, I found that temporary ination shocks are
contractionary provided the central banks active policy stance is aggressive enough; such a
stance dampens somewhat the increased e¢ cacy of temporary scal stimulus; and expan-
sionary austeritydoes not arise.
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